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ABSTRACT: Significant progress toward sustainability will require effective collaboration 
among governments, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and citizens.  But research on 
multi-stakeholder collaborative efforts as tools for achieving environmental results has identified 
an apparent paradox. Collaborative efforts can be extremely effective in enlisting participation 
of diverse participants, heightening awareness of critical problems, and catalyzing actions in the 
absence of clear public policy requirements; however, they may not be effective at achieving 
specific quantitative objectives. 
 This paper illustrates this paradox, based on the experiences of the “Sustainable Silicon Valley” 
(SSV) project in the San Francisco (California) Bay Area.  SSV is a multi-stakeholder collaboration 
among business, government, and environmental organizations.  In 2003, SSV declared a goal 
of reducing Silicon Valley’s CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared with 1990 levels.  Although 
Silicon Valley did achieve significant reductions in CO2 emissions compared with predicted 
increases, SSV did not come close to achieving the goal of 20 percent reductions for the Silicon 
Valley region as a whole. The experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley suggests that collaborative 
efforts can achieve significant progress in mobilizing leadership and support for environmental 
initiatives.  But collaborative efforts alone may not be sufficient to achieve specific environmental 
goals such as a regional CO2 emissions reduction target.
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CO2 Emissions Reduction, Voluntary Initiatives, 
Public-Private Partnerships 
I. INTRODUCTION
Significant reductions in the climate change 
contributions from urban regions will require 
effective cooperation among governments, 
businesses, non-governmental organizations, and 
citizens. This cooperation must be developed 
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at a variety of scales from local communities to 
international markets and institutions.  
 Building cooperation at the regional scale 
is particularly challenging because the stakeholders 
include multiple city and county governments, 
firms in multiple industries, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) with diverse interests, and 
citizens with conflicting perspectives.  In addition, 
participants must address conflicting factors from 
outside the region, including state and federal 
regulation, national and international market forces, 
and rapidly developing influences from civil society. 
 This paper illustrates the challenges and 
opportunities in designing and implementing a 
collaborative, voluntary regional CO2 emissions 
reduction initiative, based on the experiences of 
the “Sustainable Silicon Valley” (SSV) project 
in the San Francisco Bay Area (California, U.S.). 
SSV is a multi-stakeholder collaborative group 
of business, government, and environmental 
organizations convened in 2000 by the California 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Silicon 
Valley Manufacturing Group and the Silicon Valley 
Environmental Partnership.  SSV subsequently 
became an independent not-for-profit organization.
 The first major initiative that SSV conducted 
was a voluntary program to reduce CO2 emissions in 
Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010 compared with 
a 1990 baseline.  This voluntary, multi-stakeholder 
collaboration has achieved significant results, 
despite limited funding and a regulatory climate 
that placed little pressure on participants to become 
involved.  By the end of 2008, SSV’s partners had 
voluntarily reduced their CO2 emissions by a total 
of 758,000 tons. In addition, by December 2010 
SSV had enlisted participation of 29 of the 56 cities 
and towns in Santa Clara County and two of its 
adjacent counties.  SSV has enlisted 10 of the largest 
employers in Silicon Valley, along with more than 
60 small- and medium-sized businesses.
 However, despite significant success in 
engaging Silicon Valley cities, businesses and 
civic organizations, the CO2 emissions reduction 
initiative did not come close to achieving its 
quantitative target.  The estimated 758,000 tons of 
CO2 emissions reductions achieved by 2010 is a 2.4 
percent reduction in Silicon Valley’s 1990 total CO2 
emissions  (32.2 million tons)  and a 2.1 percent 
reduction in the region’s 2000 total CO2 emissions 
(36.4 million tons) (SVEP, 1999).
 These results reflect a paradox observed in 
other multistakeholder-collaboration efforts (Turcotte 
and Pasquero, 2001).  Collaborative efforts can be 
extremely effective in enlisting diverse participants, 
heightening awareness of critical problems, and 
catalyzing actions in the absence of clear public policy 
requirements; however, they may not be effective at 
achieving specific quantitative objectives.
 This paper provides insights on this paradox 
based on the authors’ active participation in SSV for 
more than 10 years, on the review of documents 
from participating organizations, and on semi-
structured interviews with representatives from 
cities and businesses participating in the project. 
 We begin this paper with an overview 
of prior research on collaborative environmental 
efforts.  Next we identify four empirical questions 
based on prior research. We then provide a brief 
history of Sustainable Silicon Valley and examine 
the experience of specific participants in the CO2 
emissions reduction program.  We conclude with 
implications for policymakers and business and 
environmental leaders.
II. THE PARADOX OF 
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER 
COLLABORATION 
For more than two decades, collaborative 
approaches have played an increasingly important 
role in environmental management at the societal 
level.  Multi-stakeholder collaborations such as 
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the Multistate Working Group (2008) and the 
California Green Chemistry Initiative (California 
DTSC, 2008) have made significant progress 
toward environmental goals where more traditional 
approaches such as legislation and litigation have 
failed to produce significant progress. 
 Collaboration is a “process through which 
parties who see different aspects of the problem can 
constructively explore their differences and search 
for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision 
of what is possible” (Gray, 1989). Collaborative 
approaches permit “joint ownership of decisions and 
collective responsibility for outcomes” (Hartman, 
et al., 1999). Collaboration focuses on “using 
information, divergent insights and spontaneity to 
solve problems and develop new understandings” 
(Lozano, 2007). The large number and variety of 
collaborative approaches reflect the increasing 
complexity of environmental problems, the 
increased number of “self-perceived stakeholders” 
in environmental conflicts, the interdependence 
among private, public, and civil society strategies 
for addressing problems, and the limits of traditional 
policy instruments for dealing with complex 
environmental problems (Poncelet, 2001a). 
 But multi-stakeholder collaborations create 
an apparent paradox (Turcotte and Pasquero, 2001). 
Collaborative efforts can be extremely effective in 
enlisting broad participation of diverse participants 
and catalyzing actions in the absence of clear public 
policy requirements; however, they may not be 
effective at achieving specific quantitative objectives.
 Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) describe 
a paradox they observed in one extended multi-
stakeholder collaborative roundtable.  While the 
collaboration appeared to create consensus, agreement 
“was limited mostly to general statements and weakly 
defined concepts.”  However, Turcotte and Pasquero 
point out “consensus on ambiguous or weakly 
defined concepts should not be equated with failure.” 
While the collaborative effort may not achieve major 
breakthroughs, the small wins generated may build 
significant momentum toward further progress (2001). 
In this section of the paper, we examine the many 
factors that contribute to this paradox. 
 Poncelet (2001a) offers one explanation 
for this paradox based on observations of several 
efforts he studied.   The desire to achieve consensus 
in a collaborative effort may create social pressures 
that cause participants to avoid confrontation. Some 
participants may avoid confrontation out of fear of 
damage to their reputations in the community, while 
others may suppress confrontation in order to keep 
other parties engaged.
 Conflict avoidance may be a double-edged 
sword.  On one hand, a lack of conflict may preserve 
an existing balance of power more than it promotes 
successful resolution of an environmental issue.  In 
addition, the positive public-relations benefits of 
participating in a collaborative effort may encourage 
some participants to avoid conflict in order to 
maintain the amity of the process. On the other hand, 
conflict avoidance may lead the group to avoid critical 
problems simply because they are contentious. 
 Advantages of collaboration.  According 
to Meadowcroft (1999), collaborative approaches 
offer several major advantages compared with 
conventional approaches to environmental 
management. First, they provide “a structured 
framework for encouraging pluralist inputs” 
(Meadowcroft). The range of inputs provides a wider 
knowledge base than the knowledge base that would 
be provided by a more closed process.  The structure 
of the process creates additional opportunities for 
participants to listen to and learn from each other.
 Second, collaborative approaches provide 
“a mechanism for building consensus and more 
especially for transforming interests” (Meadowcroft). 
This provides a process for changing the ways in 
which problems are defined and an opportunity for 
participants to alter the conceptions of their interests 
in the issues.
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 Third, cooperative efforts provide 
considerable flexibility concerning the definition 
of the problem, the scale at which the problem is 
addressed, and the schedule and resources assigned 
to the problem. These efforts are particularly valuable 
where public policy lags behind participants’ 
perceptions of the problems to be addressed.
 Fourth, collaborative efforts have the 
potential to create “more stable and legitimate 
policy outcomes” (Meadowcroft). These effects are 
directly related to the credibility of the participants 
in the process. An outcome endorsed by a 
coalition of industry, government and civil-society 
organizations, for example, is likely to be more 
credible to the public and less likely to generate legal 
or social challenges to the implemented solution.
 Finally, collaborative processes can provide 
a setting in which participants can share expert 
scientific and technical knowledge, along with 
other forms of relevant knowledge.  For example, 
understanding the scientific consequences of an 
environmental problem is frequently very distinct 
from understanding the social consequences of the 
same issue. A collaborative process allows holders 
of multiple kinds of knowledge to contribute to 
a shared understanding of the issues.  The results 
can be a process of shared learning that produces 
new understandings of the issues to be addressed 
(Meadowcroft).
 Other researchers including Randolph 
and Bauer (1999) have argued that a collaborative 
management process is more likely to create 
favorable outcomes and help participants feel that 
their needs and opinions have been addressed 
effectively. “Collaboration reflects an attempt 
to take collective responsibility for actions and 
outcomes.”  The collaborative process relies on 
sustained dialogue between potentially conflicting 
viewpoints, and promotes “a shared vision of the 
future” (Randolph and Bauer).
 Some forms of collaborative processes 
can be viewed as “encounters between competing 
political or economic interests” (Poncelet, 2001a). 
In such circumstances, the collaborative process 
may produce superior outcomes because of the 
learning process that occurs when participants 
share information and perspectives with each other. 
Achievement of these superior outcomes depends 
in part on the creation of a process that controls 
conflict sufficiently to allow participants to hear 
each other’s perspectives and come to appreciate the 
values underlying those perspectives.  These efforts 
create opportunities “for the production and social 
organization of (new) ways of thinking, talking, 
and acting with regard to environmental issues” 
(Poncelet, 2001a).
   Trust is both an important precondition 
and a byproduct of this process. Hood, et al. (1993) 
observe that trust and communication are challenging 
in multi-stakeholder collaborative efforts because 
of differences in organizational backgrounds of the 
participants. The level of trust that does emerge 
has significant effects both on group process and 
the long-term viability and effectiveness of the 
collaborative effort.
 The perspectives of participants may vary 
because of differences in “analytics” based on the 
professional training, personal experiences, and 
normative beliefs of participants (Weible and Moore, 
2010).  Overcoming differences in normative 
beliefs is frequently cited as an advantage of 
collaborative processes.
 Collaborative efforts may produce 
personal transformations of participants as a result 
of participation. Actors from different sectors 
may bring very different information, values, and 
preconceptions.  The process of participation gives 
those participants opportunities to “experience change 
in their subjective understandings of and relationships 
to each other, themselves, and environmental action” 
(Poncelet, 2001b). These opportunities may arise in 
particular in situations where participants need to rely 
on each other for missing information, interpretations, 
or potential solutions.
 These changes in perspective may lead to 
new perceptions of the tasks to be accomplished, 
the participants, and the appropriate modes for 
interacting across the sectors.  Changes in perception 
may lead to more effective working relationships 
among organizations, new and innovative solutions, 
and a greater willingness to address future 
environmental concerns. 
 Limitations of Multi-stakeholder 
Collaborations. Skeptics have raised concerns 
about the effectiveness of collaborative environmental 
approaches. These concerns may help explain the 
paradox described above.  Hartman, et al. (1999), 
for example, raise the issue whether specific types 
of partnerships build in preferences for incremental 
change rather than more fundamental system 
change.  Lubell  (2004) observed that, “there is 
still hot debate about the ability of collaborative 
institutions to actually build consensus, encourage 
cooperative behavior, and improve environmental 
outcomes.” He continued, “collaborative institutions 
may actually do more harm than good by creating 
perceptions of progress in the absence of any real 
change.”  He distinguished between substantive 
changes, and “symbolic policies” in which programs 
“fail to produce tangible changes in behavior and 
resource allocations, and instead consist of symbols 
connoting the suppression of some threat to the 
supporters of the policy.”  In addition, Lubell (2004) 
pointed out that, “collaborative institutions thrive on 
sustained personnel commitment because the policy 
networks that form during the planning process 
often fall apart when critical people are replaced.” 
 Meadowcroft (1999) identified four 
broad concerns related to collaboration -- power, 
democratic process, efficiency, and political culture 
-- that may contribute to the paradox. The concern 
about power recognizes that there may be significant 
differences among participants in their abilities to 
influence perceptions and outcomes of the process. 
The concern about democratic process focuses on 
the legitimacy of the participants to represent the 
interests of the public. Participants may be chosen 
based on existing relationships with the process 
conveners, and they may not represent the full range 
of interested parties. The concern about efficiency 
focuses on changes in the roles of participants from 
their conventional modes of operation. For example, 
civil-society groups may be more experienced and 
skillful at acting as watchdogs and litigants than 
they are as formulators of policy. As a result, they 
may be co-opted from their watchdog role but not 
be fully effective in helping craft solutions. The 
political culture concern addresses the differences 
in political traditions across nationalities. Where 
a strong tradition of cooperation and negotiation 
exists, collaborative efforts may produce more 
effective results than in cultures such as in the U.S. 
with more adversarial traditions.
 In a similar vein, Fadeeva (2004) identified 
several key assumptions concerning collaborative 
approaches that may not be borne out in actual 
practice. First, collaborative efforts are often assumed 
to create more efficient outcomes than conventional 
approaches to environmental policymaking. 
Collaborative efforts may be inefficient in terms 
of the time and personnel required to develop and 
implement solutions. They often lead to changes 
in behavior that fall short of changes that would be 
socially optimal.
 Second, collaborative efforts have often been 
praised for generating more innovative outcomes. 
Fadeeva observed that while these advantages may 
in fact occur, empirical evidence that they do occur 
is rather limited. 
 A related concern focuses on the potential 
for collaborative approaches to result only in “no 
regret” or “low-hanging fruit” outcomes.  This 
concern is based on the fears that collaborative 
processes may produce least common denominator 
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outcomes because participants are reluctant to 
address more complex issues that may cause conflict 
(Fadeeva).  In particular, participants may choose to 
avoid addressing elements of the problem prone to 
higher complexity or involving decision-makers not 
represented within the group.   Collaborative efforts 
face a tradeoff between achieving ambitious targets 
and causing participants to abandon the process if 
they believe the targets are unrealistic or threatening. 
 Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) observe 
that evidence of consensus and learning has 
been somewhat limited.  Similarly, evidence of 
collaborative problem solving has been mixed. 
Turcotte and Pasquero point out that collaborative 
efforts often fall into an “in-between” category, 
in which their contribution to problem solving is 
“neither complete nor insignificant.”
 Empirical questions. This apparent 
paradox concerning collaborative processes raises 
several empirical questions that are relevant for 
Sustainable Silicon Valley. 
 First, do collaborative processes increase 
social capital in ways that increase the collective 
capacity to act on complex environmental problems? 
Working together over a period of time can be 
expected to create social capital in the form of trust 
and mores of engagement (Coleman, 1988). 
 Second, do collaborative processes 
produce demonstrably better outcomes for 
complex environmental decision processes than the 
alternatives?  The prior research described above 
provides conflicting predictions.
 Third, can collaborative processes produce 
outcomes that go beyond “no regret” or “low 
hanging fruit” outcomes?  
 Finally, can multi-stakeholder efforts muster 
sufficient resources and management capacity to 
drive significant change?
 This paper examines these aspects of the 
paradox of multi-stakeholder collaboration in the 
context of Sustainable Silicon Valley’s experience with 
multi-stakeholder collaboration over the past decade. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
SUSTAINABLE SILICON 
VALLEY
Sustainable Silicon Valley began with a concept 
paper entitled, Partnership for a Sustainable Silicon 
Valley,1 written by a member of the Board of Directors 
of the Silicon Valley Environmental Partnership 
(SVEP) and adapted by two employees of Cal/EPA, 
California’s environmental regulatory agency. The 
SSV idea was to develop and implement a regional 
environmental management system (EMS).2 An EMS 
is a planned approach to managing an organization’s 
resource use and the environmental consequences 
of its activities (environmental aspects or pressures) 
while improving environmental performance.3
 Over the first two years of SSV’s EMS 
effort, participants worked toward two broad 
objectives.4  First, they would develop a partnership 
of stakeholders representing business, environmental 
groups, government, private citizens and others 
in Silicon Valley to create an environmental and 
resource sustainability management system for the 
region. Second, these partners would collaborate 
on projects to significantly reduce specific 
environmental or resource pressures.  The first major 
project selected by the group focused on energy and 
CO2 emissions reductions.
 CO2 Emissions Reduction. To address 
energy use, SSV created an Energy Subcommittee, 
later renamed the CO2 Subcommittee. This 
committee met in 2002 and 2003.  By engaging 
regularly and consistently, this ideologically diverse 
group of individuals representing a similarly diverse 
group of organizations was able to agree on a target 
and timeline for addressing this first environmental 
pressure.  The target and timeline were publicly 
announced in April 2003.  The participants in SSV 
adopted the ambitious goal to reduce CO2 emissions 
in Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010, using 1990 
as a base year. 
 Significantly, SSV partner organizations 
were permitted considerable flexibility in how to 
participate.  This included flexibility to:
• Identify their base years of choice (1990 or 
later);
• Identify their own targets for CO2 emissions 
reductions;
• Report on stationary energy use and 
associated CO2 emissions only or also 
include mobile energy use and its related 
CO2 emissions; and
• Report for some or all of the organizations’ 
facilities. 
SSV considered and rejected more uniform and stringent 
requirements. The group chose consciously to favor 
flexibility in order to encourage broader participation. 
 The SSV goal of reducing CO2 emissions 
in Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010, using 
1990 as a base year, was the goal for SSV, not its 
individual partners.  CO2 emissions were selected as 
the metric to measure progress. In its 2008 report, 
SSV reported that its partner organizations achieved 
most of their energy and CO2 reductions through 
energy conservation, energy efficiency, and onsite 
use of renewable energy.   Most SSV partners had 
made changes in their lighting systems, and some 
had begun “harvesting daylight” to reduce the need 
for artificial lighting. Also, many partners made 
efficiency improvements to their heating and cooling 
systems through additional monitoring, controls, or 
equipment changes. In addition to efficiency gains 
in lighting and heating/cooling systems, some 
municipal partners had installed higher efficiency 
street and traffic lights to reduce energy use and CO2 
emissions and had gained efficiencies in their fleets 
by retiring old vehicles, and switching to hybrid 
cars and biodiesel trucks. One regional government 
agency had purchased a fleet of bicycles for work-
related travel.
 With its initial area of emphasis established 
and its metric, target and timeline for that area of 
emphasis adopted, SSV publicized its plans. In March 
2004, at a press conference in San Jose City Hall, SSV 
announced the eleven initial pledging organizations, 
representing eight businesses -- Hewlett-Packard, 
Oracle, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space 
Company, LifeScan, Alza Pharmaceuticals, Calpine, 
Akeena Solar, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
-- and three government agencies -- the City of San 
Jose, the Santa Clara Valley Water District, and 
NASA Ames Research Center. 
 Organizational Issues. During the 
implementation of the CO2 emissions reduction 
initiative, SSV underwent significant organizational 
changes.   From 2001 to 2004, Cal EPA provided 
a full-time staff member. With a change of 
administration, and a significant budget crisis, 
Cal EPA chose to discontinue funding for that 
position. To avoid closing down SSV, four 
participants -- including one representative from 
Cal EPA, one from SVLG, and two from SVEP -- 
chose to launch SSV as an independent, nonprofit 
(501[c][3]) organization in June 2004.  The Cal 
EPA staff member who had been serving as project 
manager, took a leave of absence from the state 
agency and became the Executive Director of the 
newly created organization.
 Throughout its life as a nonprofit 
organization, SSV has been chronically underfunded. 
The initial executive director served for two years at 
a minimal and periodically deferred salary.   SSV 
has hired three executive directors since 2006 
and experienced a severe mismatch between the 
workload required and the resources available to 
staff the program. During the fiscal year that ended 
in June 2010, the annual budget for the organization 
had reached approximately $250,000 and staffing 
had reached two FTE (SSV, 2010b).
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 This chronic underfunding limited SSV’s 
ability to implement the CO2 emissions reduction 
program and the EMS. However, targeted staff 
efforts, significant amounts of volunteer staffing, and 
in-kind contributions permitted SSV to administer 
a steady stream of programs for participants.  SSV 
coordinated and facilitated monthly meetings 
where partners gathered to share best practices 
and network for the purpose of resolving energy 
and CO2 emissions-related issues. These monthly 
meetings were supplemented with education forums 
held quarterly to share best practices, as well as with 
periodic special programs, for example, a visit to a 
new green building or to learn energy management 
methodologies from a participating firm.
 The organization continued through 2009 
to track the progress of participating organizations 
toward the CO2 reduction goal, but has reduced the 
intensity of activities focused on energy conservation 
since then.  The current organization focuses on three 
areas – energy, water and communities of practice.
 Results of the CO2 Emissions Reduction 
Program. SSV continued its efforts to recruit 
additional organizations to help meet its CO2 
emissions reduction target.  In its Sustainable 
Silicon Valley 2009 Annual Report, the fifth annual 
report on its CO2 initiative, SSV reported that it 
had 121 partners involved in its CO2 emissions 
reduction initiative at the end of 2008.  According 
to the report, the 87 SSV partners that reported data 
had reduced their CO2 emissions by a total of 66,000 
tons in 2008 and by 758,000 tons between 1990 and 
the end of 2008.  According to the report, these 
758,000 tons of emissions reduction is equivalent 
to removing almost 126,000 automobiles from the 
road or removing almost 350,000 homes from the 
local electricity grid for a year.5 
 These data indicate that despite substantial 
CO2 emissions reductions by SSV participants, the 
Silicon Valley region would not achieve SSV’s target 
emissions reduction of 20 percent by 2010 compared 
with a 1990 baseline.  While SSV participants had 
achieved reductions at a rate substantially greater 
than that of the Valley as a whole, it seems clear 
that progress toward an agreed-upon goal may 
not have been possible entirely through voluntary 
means. Legislation6 to create mandatory limits on 
CO2 emissions for California was enacted in 2006 
(Assembly Bill 32). The legislation required that 
actions to reduce CO2 emissions begin to be phased 
in starting in 2011.  Testimonials from elected 
officials at the state and national levels indicated that 
voluntary initiatives such as SSV’s CO2 program, 
helped set the stage for this legislation. In 2004, for 
example, US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D, CA) in 
a letter to the President and CEO of Silicon Valley 
Manufacturing Group, applauded the public-private 
nature of SSV and noted that its “goal of reducing 
emissions 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2010 
creates an ambitious marker for others to follow.”7
 In 2005, California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger announced greenhouse gas 
reductions goals for the state and publicly 
acknowledged the leadership of SSV business 
partners to address this issue “even faster than the 
statewide goals.”8
 Those SSV partners who, for the 2008 SSV 
report, provided energy use or CO2 emissions data 
for their facilities between 2000 and 2007, reported 
average emissions reductions of 27 percent in that 
timeframe,9 over three times the emissions reductions 
the United States would have had to achieve under 
the Kyoto Protocol.  In the press release announcing 
the availability of its 2007 report, the chair of the 
board of SSV said, “Sustainable Silicon Valley 
partners are outperforming the Silicon Valley by 
a three to one margin … Our partners are saving 
money, saving energy and helping the environment.”
In the press release announcing the availability of 
its 2008 report, the chair of the board of SSV said, 
“Not only does our 2008 report explain SSV’s 
proven, workable model for environmental quality 
and economic vitality, but our partners’ results from 
the CO2 Emission Reduction Initiative demonstrate 
that the state’s AB32 goals are possible to achieve 
and can deliver a significant return on investment 
for businesses, local governments and organizations 
of all sizes.”
 These comments highlight the paradox of 
multi-stakeholder collaboration. SSV participants 
significantly out-performed non-participants in 
achieving energy efficiency gains, and collaboration 
clearly resulted in energy efficiency actions that 
could not have occurred without the knowledge 
sharing promoted by the program.  The CO2 
reductions that resulted clearly exceeded the levels 
of reductions that would have occurred in the 
absence of collaboration.  Nonetheless, the program 
fell significantly short of its goals.
III. LEARNING FROM SSV 
PARTICIPANTS
Interviews with participants from individual cities 
and businesses provided insights into the causes 
and consequences of these apparently paradoxical 
results.  We interviewed project participants 
from three of the 22 cities that were SSV partner 
organizations at the time of our field research –
Palo Alto, San Jose and Sunnyvale – and two large 
businesses – LifeScan, a subsidiary of Johnson and 
Johnson, and Applied Materials.  They provided 
significant insights on both drivers of and barriers to 
action on CO2 emissions.
 Both the public and private sector 
participants said that external and public pressure 
related to climate change was a driving force for their 
efforts. Public pressure was particularly relevant in 
the cities,10 as citizens’ involvement was critical for 
the cities to begin to take action on climate change. 
City representatives attributed increased public 
interest and pressure to many causes, including the 
popularity of the movie, An Inconvenient Truth, 
as well as the recent increase in media attention to 
global climate change. Ongoing development and 
redevelopment in the cities and the interest of the 
public in seeing adoption of greener practices were 
also perceived to be contributing factors. 
 The business participants reported that SSV 
reporting requirements dovetailed nicely with other 
data reporting efforts in which they were involved. 
These participants said that they were already 
developing data reports on their organizations’ basic 
energy use and CO2 emissions inventory so they 
did not have to do any special reporting for SSV. 
Additionally, they were creating internal reports that 
highlighted notable projects that reduced energy use 
and/or CO2 emissions, so including these project 
descriptions for SSV reporting was not a burden.
 All participants said the flexibility in the 
SSV reporting requirements was an important 
asset of the organization. Several participants also 
cited the reporting requirement itself as a benefit, 
suggesting that reporting on progress forced the 
organization to deal more seriously with the issue in 
order to show progress.  
 The SSV reporting protocol provided partner 
organizations with flexibility in several dimensions. 
However, participants saw reporting flexibility as a 
double-edged sword. By having this flexibility, there 
was no firm, clear set of goals that had to be reached. 
However, even with this caveat, the interviewee who 
mentioned this agreed that on balance, reporting 
flexibility was a significant benefit.  
 One participant observed that reporting 
flexibility became a collective liability for SSV as 
a whole. Reporting flexibility led to inconsistencies 
between partners that became apparent in the 
third year of reporting as the number of reporting 
partners increased, and SSV staff had to deal with 
organizations choosing different baselines and 
measuring different things. 
 As participants discussed the barriers they 
faced, it became clear that dealing with climate 
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change was a difficult challenge for all of them. 
Cities reported, for example, that getting traction 
with city staff and city council was a difficult barrier; 
there was also the need to get money to pursue the 
activities related to climate change. 
 Cities also reported a lack of continuing 
leadership at the highest levels (for example, the mayor 
or city manager) as other priorities took precedence, 
for example, public safety, infrastructure needs, etc. 
As a result, in addition to a lack of funding there was 
a lack of direction to city staff. City leaders did not 
say to department heads, “We want this to happen” 
so it did not happen. One interviewee suggested that 
it is critical to have a climate change champion (not 
necessarily an expert) at the top. The interviewee 
went on to say that in a city that champion must be 
the mayor, not a councilmember.
 One participant indicated that current 
city approaches were not adequate.  She said that 
elected officials needed to be made aware that 
addressing climate change is not the job of one city 
councilmember. It is the job of all of them and all of 
the departments within the city. Such local lobbying 
of city and business leaders by SSV is important, as 
is bringing in private sector champions to meet with 
city officials and business leaders. For example, at 
a city-hosted meeting in San Jose, a representative 
from Adobe Systems Inc. said, “We saved over $1 
million by using LEED11 for existing buildings.” This 
statement got the city council members wondering 
if the city too might save money by following LEED 
guidelines. 
 One business participant criticized his 
colleagues in the private sector.  “None of the 
companies has a comprehensive program to address 
energy efficiency and climate change. They are doing 
individual things as they hear about new technologies, 
but there is no systematic approach. This is not only 
about energy; it is about water, it is about cars on the 
road used by the sales force, it is about the company’s 
complete environmental footprint.”  
 Participants suggested that the urgency 
of dealing with climate change needs to be 
better communicated to other municipalities and 
companies to get them more involved and get them 
started on comprehensive programs to increase 
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Over time, SSV participants came to 
realize that collaboration across sectoral boundaries 
could be an important success factor.
 One business participant reported that 
his organization, along with the SSV Executive 
Director, met with officials in the city in which 
the participant’s business is located, to try to get 
the city to develop its own comprehensive energy 
efficiency program and to encourage businesses 
within its jurisdiction to do likewise.  Although the 
city officials seemed interested during the meeting, 
a significant amount of time had passed at the time 
of the interview and the participant reported that he 
had yet to see any action by the city. 
 Business participants’ criticisms were not 
limited to this single city. They suggested that cities 
throughout Silicon Valley needed to get involved 
with SSV and they needed to encourage their 
businesses to get involved as well. They suggested 
that the cities should help get the message out that 
there are ways of addressing climate change. “Cities 
have a lot of pull with businesses and they should 
use it,” said one interviewee.
 As these interviews indicate, there is 
strong evidence that SSV participants came to 
think of climate change as an issue to be addressed 
collaboratively and not just to be addressed within 
their own organizations or sectors.  Participants 
came to realize that they shared problems such 
as organizational inertia, insufficient leadership, 
and inadequate resources with colleagues in other 
organizations and other sectors.  Sustainable Silicon 
Valley appears to have contributed significantly 
to raising awareness of climate change issues, to 
have created significant sharing of best practices 
among participating organizations, and to have built 
significant trust and cooperation among participants 
who did not initially see themselves as allies. 
However, the failure to achieve the CO2 emissions 
reduction goal illustrates the paradox of collaborative 
efforts – while collaboration can launch significant 
action toward achieving environmental objectives 
in ways that traditional public policies may not 
be effective, they may not be sufficient to achieve 
significant goals such as stopping and reversing 
climate change.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
SSV is a positive example of a regional, multi-
stakeholder collaborative initiative addressing 
a problem despite the lack of state and federal 
government leadership and action on the issue. 
Such grassroots efforts can build significant 
progress toward solving complex problems if 
leaders from local government and the business 
and environmental communities come together 
and focus on their commonalties rather than their 
differences.  The results of the program and the 
insights from participant interviews permit some 
preliminary answers to the empirical questions 
identified above concerning creation of social 
capital, ability to create better outcomes relative to 
alternatives, ability to create outcomes beyond “no 
regrets” levels, and the ability to generate sufficient 
resources and management capacity to succeed. 
 Social Capital. First, we asked whether 
collaborative processes increase social capital in 
ways that increase the collective capacity to act 
on complex environmental problems?  Anecdotal 
evidence strongly suggests that participants learned 
from each other, provided valuable tools and insights 
to each other, and developed strong mutual respect 
for each other.  
 This development of social capital 
was evident in the early workings of the SSV 
collaboration, as interested stakeholders came 
together to address the serious issue of global climate 
change. For example, the Silicon Valley Toxics 
Coalition, a local environmental group that has long 
been a thorn in the side of many high-tech and other 
companies in Silicon Valley, was a key representative 
of the environmental community in the early days of 
SSV.  Notwithstanding the longstanding adversarial 
relationship of the Toxics Coalition with these 
firms, representatives from this organization and 
those from some major Silicon Valley firms were 
able to put aside their longstanding differences and 
work together to shape what would become SSV. 
Rather than focusing on the differences between 
the organizations, the representatives agreed to 
focus on the common goal as defined by SSV. The 
implications of this social capital go well beyond the 
SSV collaboration if the parties choose to continue 
to engage with one another.
 SSV has been a very open process 
throughout its existence. Cal EPA and the Silicon 
Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG) convened 
the initial meetings and sent broad invitations to 
potential participants. While there was an informal 
core group that showed up for a majority of the 
early meetings, that core group evolved continually 
over time. Many individuals made significant 
contributions over short periods and then faded into 
the background. A small group, which formed the 
core of the 501(C)(3) organization, stayed engaged 
for most of the organization’s first decade. Other 
dedicated volunteers managed the quarterly forum 
events and other special events without actively 
engaging in other aspects of SSV’s work.
 This openness has been a mixed blessing, 
but on balance it has widened community support 
for addressing climate change, and it has led to a 
wide range of actions not actively coordinated by 
SSV. Unlike many of the collaborative processes 
discussed in the literature, for example, Turcotte and 
Pasquero (2001) or Poncelet (2001a), the participants 
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in the selection of the CO2 emissions reduction target 
did not form a close-knit community. However, this 
loosely coupled community created broad support 
for learning and action to address climate change in 
Silicon Valley. Annual conferences created a forum 
that attracted a broad cross-section of organizations 
in the region and provided a platform for deeper 
discussions of climate change issues and for 
exploration of other environmental issues such as 
water conservation.
 Over time several other organizations 
convened competing CO2 emission reduction 
programs, as factors inside and outside of Silicon 
Valley increased support for action to address 
climate change. When SSV started its CO2 program 
in 2004, participants reported little involvement 
in other voluntary climate programs.  By 2009, 
many participants reported that they had to choose 
among several voluntary CO2 emissions reductions 
programs; these programs had varying reporting 
requirements, varying participation costs, and 
varying levels of public credibility.  
 As national and international attention on 
climate change has increased, other organizations, 
including Joint Venture Silicon Valley (JVSV) and 
Silicon Valley Leadership Group (SVLG), have 
launched voluntary CO2 emissions reduction efforts 
of their own in the same or in overlapping geographic 
regions. This cooperation and competition has 
broadened the constituency for actions to address 
climate change but has slowed SSV’s momentum in 
attracting participants to its CO2 emissions reduction 
program. We believe this growing competition indicates 
that SSV contributed to the growth of social capital to be 
used to address climate change.  However, SSV was less 
effective at appropriating that social capital to achieve its 
own objectives.
 Better outcomes.  Next, we asked whether 
collaborative processes produce demonstrably 
better outcomes for complex environmental 
decision processes than the alternatives.  The 
evidence provided above indicates that SSV 
participants achieved significant CO2 reductions in 
the absence of any effective public policies at the 
federal or state level to require or encourage such 
reductions. Participants specifically identified SSV 
programs that contributed substantially to those 
efforts.  These quantitative and qualitative results 
suggest that SSV’s efforts produced demonstrably 
better outcomes than would have occurred without 
the multi-stakeholder collaboration.
 Collaborative efforts face clear trade-
offs between providing flexibility to encourage 
broad participation and stringent requirements 
required to achieve ambitious goals. SSV made a 
conscious choice to provide maximum flexibility 
in order to encourage broader participation. That 
flexibility clearly permitted participation by some 
organizations, both in business and in government, 
that would not have chosen to participate in a program 
with more stringent requirements. This allowed SSV 
to broaden the conversation within Silicon Valley 
and to avoid an adversarial relationship between 
these participants and environmental groups.
 Flexibility in target setting and choice of 
baseline enabled broader participation in SSV than 
would have occurred otherwise.  This flexibility 
conflicted with some of the insights from the economic 
literature on voluntary environmental initiatives. 
Segerson (1999), for example, argues that voluntary 
initiatives can be economically efficient provided 
that the initiative specifies the target to be reached 
but allows participants the flexibility to decide how to 
reach the targets.  SSV chose consciously to sacrifice 
efficiency in the short run in order to encourage the 
widest possible participation. The subsequent growth 
of the participant list (and corresponding growth in 
CO2 emissions reductions) suggests that, on balance 
the potential loss in efficiency was compensated for 
by the increase in participation.
 However, this flexibility gave SSV little 
chance to achieve its ambitious CO2 reduction goals. 
While SSV participants showed significantly greater 
CO2 reductions than the Valley as a whole, little 
collective attention was given to the gap between 
the stated goal and the collective performance of 
Silicon Valley.
 Beyond no regret outcomes? Next, 
we asked whether collaborative processes could 
produce outcomes that go beyond “no regret” or 
“low hanging fruit” outcomes?  The reporting 
protocol for SSV’s CO2 reduction program provided 
considerable flexibility in the choice of baselines, 
which facilities to include, and the targets to set.  This 
flexibility created sufficient ambiguity to prevent 
us from concluding that participants achieved CO2 
reductions beyond what would be expected in a “no 
regret” scenario.
 A related issue concerns the lingering 
question whether collaborative efforts can produce 
results that go beyond the efforts that organizations 
would have taken in the absence of the program.12 
Interview data and anecdotal evidence suggest 
that the results reported in the SSV CO2 reduction 
program include both emissions reductions that 
would have occurred anyway and emissions 
reductions that can be directly attributed to best-
practice sharing programs administered by SSV. 
 Resources and management capacity. 
Finally, we asked whether multi-stakeholder 
collaborations could generate sufficient resources 
and management capacity to generate change, in 
the absence of strong public policy mandates.  The 
SSV example does not permit us to give a definitive 
answer.  SSV was limited by lack of financial 
resources and management capacity throughout 
its first decade.  While the organization attracted 
extensive organizational participation, it did not 
attract sufficient funding to provide adequate staffing. 
This chronic understaffing contributed to the burnout 
that led the organization to have four executive 
directors in five years.
 The question we cannot answer is whether 
more experienced non-profit managers could have 
produced a different outcome.  The challenge of 
producing huge results with inadequate funding is 
common among non-profit organizations. But, finding 
managers with sufficient environmental expertise as 
well as expertise in non-profit management and fund-
raising is an ongoing problem.
 The public good nature of the expected 
benefits may lead systematically to underinvestment 
by the collaborating parties. None of the parties 
will be able to claim full credit for the results, or to 
capture the benefits. The inability of any of the parties 
to capture the full benefits from the program may 
lead each participant to underinvest in the desired 
outcomes. The lack of public consensus about the 
issues to be addressed may decrease the willingness 
of participants to invest in the collaborative effort 
even further.  
 We do believe that this problem may 
be endemic to multi-stakeholder collaborations 
launched without explicit public policy mandates. 
SSV addressed concerns over CO2 emissions long 
before a policy consensus began to emerge in 
California.  This lack of consensus appeared to make 
participation and financial investment in a regional 
effort optional for key players.  SSV would have 
not been able to succeed at all without the forward-
looking contributions from leading Silicon Valley 
firms and city governments.
 Charitable foundations were particularly 
missing from the SSV process.  One leading 
foundation inadvertently summarized the paradox, 
when it declined to participate in what it characterized 
as an admirable effort, because it did not want to 
pay for programs it believed that the government 
should be funding.  But as we have described 
above, the lack of a policy mandate to address an 
important environmental problem contributed to the 
initial motivation for starting this multi-stakeholder 
collaborative effort.
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V. LINGERING QUESTIONS
The experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley 
illustrates the paradox of multi-sector voluntary 
collaboration at the regional scale to address 
environmental problems and opportunities such as 
climate change.  The SSV experience illustrates that, 
with patience and persistence, leaders from industry, 
government and non-government organizations can 
help mobilize necessary change, even in the absence 
of clear policy direction at the state or national level. 
 However, collaborative efforts alone may 
not be sufficient to achieve specific environmental 
goals such as a regional CO2 emissions reduction 
target.  Collaborative efforts may be most effective 
at building broad mandates, creating social capital 
and building momentum to achieve progress 
in advance of public policy mandates.  The 
experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley suggests 
that collaborative efforts can achieve significant 
progress in mobilizing leadership and support for 
environmental initiatives, but achieving specific 
and ambitious goals may require other approaches 
with greater power to compel or incent action by all 
participants in a region.
 The experience of Sustainable Silicon 
Valley does not provide clear answers to the 
question whether the paradox of multi-stakeholder 
collaboration is an inherent feature of these efforts, 
or merely a reflection of limited resources, and 
a need for improved management effectiveness. 
We believe comparative studies of other multi-
stakeholder collaborations may provide useful 
insights into this question.
 The SSV experience does illustrate the 
broad power of multi-stakeholder collaborations to 
bridge the gaps between participants with strongly 
diverging views and to generate momentum toward 
solutions to complex problems.  We believe that 
such collaborations can become a powerful tool for 
addressing emerging issues if we can more fully 
understand the paradox of collaboration and identify 
management practices to help overcome the effects 
of the paradox.
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